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In the absence of justice, what is sovereignty but organized 
brigandage? 
 
St. Augustine1
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in part, 
that private property shall not “be taken for public use without just 
compensation.”  This is the so-called “Takings Clause,” and, since the 
Supreme Court’s 1922 opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it has 
served as a limitation on government regulatory actions that go “too 
far” in restricting the use of property.  Defining “how far is too far” is 
the central objective of Supreme Court takings jurisprudence, but the 
Court’s analysis is recognized by all to be (as it is most politely 
phrased) “a muddle.”2
Perhaps the most important reason for this “muddle” is the failure 
of the Court to articulate a coherent conceptual basis for the Takings 
Clause.  A variety of themes that have been advanced to describe the 
basis of the Takings Clause.  For some, the Takings Clause represents 
a critical component of personal liberty that bars the government from 
interfering with some almost absolute right to property.  For others, it 
is merely a codification on the government’s authority to appropriate 
title through eminent domain.   
One important theme arises from the otherwise unremarkable case 
of Armstrong v. United States. In that opinion, Justice Black 
advanced the dogmatic conclusion that the Takings Clause “was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”3 This conception of the Takings Clause has 
been cited in numerous cases since Armstrong.  In Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, for 
example, Justice Stevens devoted much of his opinion to an analysis 
of whether principles of “justice and fairness” justified temporary 
restrictions on construction under the Takings Clause. 
This conception of “justice and fairness” embodied in Armstrong 
1. St. Augustine, The City of God, 88 (Image Press, 1958). 
 2. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is 
Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561 (1984) 
 3. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  Black’s opinion 
refers to “fairness and justice,” but the Supreme Court routinely cites the 
proposition as “justice and fairness.”  See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  Who am I to differ; I go 
with “justice and fairness.” 
The court has also, in a number of cases since Armstrong, cited to similar 
dogmatic language in the 1893 case, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. U.S.,
148 U.S. 312, 325 (1893) in which the Court stated that the Fifth 
Amendment “prevents the public from loading upon one individual more 
than his just share of the burdens of government….” The principle is, 
however, generally traced to Armstrong. See William Michael Treanor, The 
Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings, and Compensation Statutes,
38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1151 (1997); 
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raises one of the central concerns of moral philosophy – an issue that 
has captured the attention of philosophers from Aristotle to Star 
Trek’s Mr. Spock - when do the needs of the many outweigh the needs 
of the few?4 In Aristotelian terms, this is the issue of “distributive 
justice” or the ethical analysis of the distribution of benefits and 
burdens in society.5
An issue of philosophy to academics, this issue of distributive 
justice has now been converted by the Court in to an issue of 
constitutional law.  Although the Supreme Court, since Armstrong,
has described the Takings Clause as reflecting a concern for 
distributive justice, it has never explained the historical or legal basis 
for this view.  Perhaps worse, the Court has not directly addressed the 
consequences of incorporating principles of distributive justice into 
the Fifth Amendment. 
The purpose of this essay is to consider some of the implications of 
incorporating a principle of distributive justice into the Fifth 
Amendment.6 It begins with an analysis of the origins of Fifth 
Amendment regulatory Takings analysis and the basis (or lack of one) 
for the inclusion of a principle of distributive justice.  Next it briefly 
discusses the concept of distributive justice reflected in the Armstrong 
principles of “justice and fairness.”  Finally, it addresses four key 
implications of incorporating a conception of distributive justice into 
the takings clause.  First, a focus on distributive justice is a move 
away from an assessment of government regulation of private 
property based on individual “rights.”  Second, the traditional takings 
factors previously advanced by the Court can be seen in a new way if 
analyzed in light of principles of distributive justice.  Third, a focus on 
distributive justice may open new sources for evaluating takings.  
Finally, a concern for distributive justice raises troubling questions 
about the legitimacy of decisions grounded, not in history or neutral 
principles, but in an unelected judiciary’s views of principles of 
justice and fairness.  A grounding of the Takings Clause in these 
 
4. See generally Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan (1982). 
 5. See infra notes 27-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
concept of distributive justice.  Fairness, at least since Aristotle, has been 
seen as involving a number of distinct applications.  Thus, distributive 
justice can be seen as analytically distinct from retributive and compensatory 
justice. 
 6. The objectives of this essay are thus modest.  It is not my intent to 
derive a “takings test” based on principles of distributive justice or to 
evaluate the outcome of any dispute in those terms.  Rather, it is to raise 
some of the serious implications that follow from incorporation a principle 
of distributive justice into the Takings Clause. 
There is a growing literature that on the role of “justice and fairness” in 
takings analysis.  Perhaps the most influential article in the field is Professor 
Michelman’s classic, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the 
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation, 80 Harv. L.Rev. 1165 (1967).  
Other scholars have taken up the challenge of interpreting the requirements 
of the Takings Clause in light of the Supreme Court’s reference to “justice 
and fairness.”  See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice, 85
Va. L.Rev. 741 (1999); Treanor, supra note 3; Leigh Raymond, Comment, 
The Ethics of Compensation: Takings, Utility, and Justice, 23 Ecology L.Q. 
577 (1996). 
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ethical principles may suggest an extremely limited role for the Court 
in finding a regulatory taking. 
I.  SEARCHING FOR THE MEANING OF THE TAKINGS 
CLAUSE: HISTORY, POWER AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Although many see the Takings Clause as a central statement of 
fundamental liberty, the Takings Clause has two dirty little secrets. 
First, there is virtually no historical evidence on the intent that lay 
behind the adoption of the Taking Clause in the Fifth Amendment.  
Second, it was not until 1922 that the Supreme Court, in what was an 
extraordinary act of judicial activism, claimed that the Takings Clause 
acted to limit government regulatory authority. 
A. THE HISTORICAL BASIS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE 
Although there were ideas current in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (and contemporaneous land use regulation by States) that 
might inform an interpretation of the Takings Clause, there is almost 
no direct evidence of the intent of those who actually proposed and 
adopted the Takings Clause.7 The Bill of Rights was adopted by 
Congress in 1789 and subsequently ratified by the States.8 Many of 
the provisions in the Bill of Rights arose from petitions submitted by 
the states, but this was not the case with the Takings Clause.  The 
Takings Clause stands alone as the only part of the Bill of Rights that 
was not requested by a single state.9
Madison’s first draft of what became the Takings Clause stated that 
a person could not “be obligated to relinquish his property, where it 
may be necessary for public use, without just compensation.”10 This 
draft was later revised, without explanation, into its current version by 
 
7. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the 
Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 Northwestern U. L.Rev. 1099 
(2000); John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use and Its Significance for Modern 
Takings Doctrine, 109 Harv. L.Rev. 1252 (1996); William Michael Treanor, 
The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694 (1985). 
Perhaps the best exchange on the role of history in evaluating takings 
claims arose between Justices Scalia and Blackmun in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  In his majority opinion, 
Justice Scalia finds that the Taking Clause is grounded in some, presumably 
Lockean, “historical compact.”  Id. At 1028.  Justice Blackmun in dissent 
describes the lack of historical basis for the majority’s view.  Id. at 1056.  
Scalia, in a footnote rebuttal, disputes the relevance of the historical record. 
Id. at 1028 n. 15. Blackmun, getting in the last word, writes: “I cannot 
imagine where the Court finds its ‘historical compact,’ if not in history.”  Id.
at 1060 n. 26. 
 8. Actually, Congress adopted twelve amendments as part of the Bill of 
Rights; only ten were subsequently ratified by States. 
 9. See E. Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today 161-
63 (1957). 
 10. See The Complete Bill of Rights: the drafts, debates, sources, and 
origins 361 (Neil H. Cogan, ed. 1997); Treanor, supra note 7 at 708-712 
(discussion of the history of the adoption of the Takings Clause and 
discussion of Madison’s views). 
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a Committee of the House of Representatives.  In the reported debate 
on the proposed Bill of Rights in the House and Senate, there is no 
reference to the Takings Clause.11 Certainly the Takings Clause did 
not reflect an eighteenth century view that the government could not 
regulate land without providing compensation; scholars have pointed 
to numerous practices of the states at the time of adoption of the Bill 
of Rights that involved substantial government regulation of land use 
without compensation.12 
In short, there is no contemporaneous evidence that the people who 
drafted or adopted the Takings Clause cast the provision as a central 
protection of government regulation of private property.13 Even more 
certainly, there is no evidence that the Takings Clause “was designed” 
to incorporate principles of distributive justice.  This, of course, does 
not mean that the Takings Clause cannot fill that role; it does, 
however, raise real questions as to whether the “original intent” of its 
drafters supports a specific view of the meaning or purpose of the 
Takings Clause. 
B. HOLMES, PENNSYLVANIA COAL, AND A JUDICIAL POWER GRAB 
The Takings Clause was the subject of relatively little attention until 
the pivotal Supreme Court case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in 
1922.14 Pennsylvania Coal involved a challenge by coal companies to 
a Pennsylvania statute that required coal companies engaged in 
subsurface mining to leave pillars of coal in place to support the 
surface from subsidence.  Justice Holmes, in a short but seminal 
opinion, held that the statute violated the Takings Clause.  The 
Supreme Court, for the first time, announced the crucial proposition 
that a regulation may violate the Takings Clause even if it does not 
effect a physical appropriation of property.  As Holmes stated: “The 
general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a 
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking.”15 
11. See Cogan, supra note 10 at 375. 
 12. See Hart, supra note 7. 
 13. This has not prevented some from finding a specific intent underlying 
the Takings Clause in certain ideas current at the time of adoption of the Bill 
of Rights.  Thus, Richard Epstein would define the purposes of the Takings 
Clause in his particular reading of John Locke. See Richard Epstein, 
Takings: Private Property and Eminent Domain (1985).  In Epstein’s view, 
only “reciprocity of advantage” would justify a government regulation that 
seemed to diminish the value of property.  In other words, Epstein would 
interpret the Takings Clause to prohibit redistributive goals of government.  
Douglas Kmiec would find a definite meaning in the Takings Clause arising 
from Blackstone’s views on the absolute nature of property. In Dean 
Kmiec’s views, government regulation that diminishes value is limited to 
those expectations of property ownership, defined by common law views of 
nuisance, that underlay some eighteenth century commentator’s views of 
property ownership.  See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of 
the Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630 
(1988) 
 14. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 15. Id. at 415. 
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To be sure there is an obvious logic to the proposition.  Being 
precluded from making use of your property may have the same effect 
as having title actually taken by the government.  But besides the 
“obvious,” on what did Holmes rely for this groundbreaking 
proposition?16 The answer is nothing.  Holmes cites to no support for 
this position other than the self-evident logic.  Whatever its “obvious” 
logic and appeal, the expansion of the Takings Clause to cover 
regulatory acts by the government was a tremendous shift from the 
Court’s past treatment of the Takings Clause.17 It was, and is, an 
extraordinary assertion of the judiciary’s authority to invalidate 
otherwise validly adopted government regulation based on a court’s 
view of whether the regulation goes “too far.”  Few opinions of the 
Supreme Court have resulted in so great a usurpation of authority by 
the judiciary with so little support. 
Holmes sketched out a variety of factors that he viewed as relevant 
to determining “how far” is “too far” for purposes of determining 
whether a regulation constitutes a taking of private property.  I will 
discuss some of those below, but the crucial first step was the equation 
of regulation with a taking.  Since Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has 
identified a limited class of “per se” takings, but the major theme of 
Supreme Court takings analysis has been an “ad hoc” balancing of 
factors whose basis have largely been unexamined and unexplained.18 
C. ARMSTRONG, FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE 
In 1960, the Supreme Court announced what was a new and 
distinctive statement of the purpose of the Takings Clause.  In 
Armstrong v. United States,19 Justice Black made the following 
assertion about “the” purpose of the Takings Clause.  According to 
Black: 
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not 
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed 
to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.20 
There is much to be said for this view of the Takings Clause, but what 
 
16. That is, in fact, the basis for Holmes’ opinion; he states that 
“obviously” government regulatory must have some limits. Id.
17. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 
(1992), Justice Scalia acknowledged that prior to Pennsylvania Coal the 
Takings Clause had been limited in application to situations of direct 
appropriation of private property. 
18 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 545 U.S. 528 (2005) for a discussion 
of the Court’s existing approach to evaluating regulatory takings.  See infra 
notes     for a discussion of the factors generally identified by the Court as 
relevant in an “ad hoc” balance. 
 19. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 20. Id. at 49. 
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cannot be said is that it is founded in history or precedent.  What 
source does Justice Black rely on for his statement about the purpose 
of the Takings Clause?  Black cites the same source as Justice Holmes 
in Pennsylvania Coal – nothing.21 Although this view of the Fifth 
Amendment has been repeated many times by the Court,22 it is 
generally supported by a citation to Black’s statement in Armstrong.
Nothing in the history of the adoption of the Takings Clause, of 
course, directly supports this position, and the Supreme Court has 
done nothing since Armstrong to justify its legitimacy. 
Content to cite Black’s statement of the Takings Clause, the 
Supreme Court has never seriously explored the implications of 
viewing the Takings Clause in terms of distributive justice. Indeed, 
the Court seems to have shied away from any serious analysis.  In 
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,23 Justice O’Connor, noted that 
[t]he concepts of “fairness and justice” that underlie the Takings 
Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate.  Accordingly, 
we have eschewed ‘any “set formula” for determining when 
“justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by 
public action by compensated by the government, rather than 
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. The 
outcome instead ‘depends largely “upon the particular 
circumstances [in that] case.24 
In essence, in assessing “justice and fairness” the Court has resorted to 
the same ad hoc balancing that has been the court’s traditional 
approach to the Takings Clause since Pennsylvania Coal.
This was certainly the approach the Court adopted in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.25 Justice 
Stevens’ majority opinion purported to address directly whether 
principles of “justice and fairness” would themselves support a 
categorical rule that development moratoria constituted a Fifth 
Amendment Taking.  In rejecting such a categorical rule, Justice 
Stevens again essentially equated the application of principles of 
“justice and fairness” to the case-by-case balancing approach 
conventionally employed by the Court in takings cases.  Although 
Justice Stevens assessed traditional factors in his analysis, there was 
nothing which applied those factors in any way that uniquely 
evaluated the distributional justice issues raised by the Armstrong 
principles.26 
21. Justice Black does provide a “cf.” to Thibodo v. United States, 187 
F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1951).  This Ninth Circuit case, of no particular ethical 
pedigree, involved a rather technical discussion of whether a bond holder 
could recover principal and interest when the government condemned land 
securing the bond. 
 22. The Supreme Court, by my Westlaw search, has cited to this 
statement in Armstrong 16 times since 1960. 
 23. 533 U.S. 606 (2001) 
 24. Id. at 633 (citations omitted). 
 25. 535 U.S. 203 (2002). 
26 The statement, and its logic, was applied with perhaps the greatest force 
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If, however, the Court is going to ground Takings analysis in 
conceptions of “justice and fairness” it is time to confront the 
implications of this approach. 
III.  PRINCIPLES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
The concept of distributive justice has, at its core, a concern with 
the fair distribution of resources among members of society. It 
involves basic questions relating to the justifications for resolving 
competing claims to finite resources.  What is a just distribution and 
what are the qualities that entitle an individual to claim a just share?  
It also involves, in the words of the Armstrong Principle, a concern 
for deciding when costs can be imposed on a few and when “in justice 
and fairness” such costs should be born by the public as a whole. 
Evaluation of the concept of distributive justice has been a basic 
part of Western ethical thinking for over three thousands of years.  
Aristotle’s writings in the Nichomacean Ethics are still central to 
discussions in this area.  Enlightenment philosophers, especially 
David Hume, have described fundamental principles that govern an 
evaluation of distributive justice.  Over the last fifty years, much of 
the academic literature has focused on economic and game theoretic 
approaches to evaluation of distributive justice. John Rawls’ work on 
evaluation of the fairness of institutions and the role of impartiality 
has become a basic part of any discussion of distributive justice.  The 
literature on distributive justice is enormous and can be 
extraordinarily technical. 
As with most areas of ethics, the literature produces many questions 
but few answers.  General consensus on a number of fundamental 
principles does exist, however, and these principles guide the search 
for theories of distributive justice. 
A. PREMISES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
One concept stands at the center of an evaluation of distributive 
justice; it is the concept of equality.  At least since Aristotle, the basic 
tenet of distributive justice is the requirement of equality of treatment 
of individuals.  To paraphrase Aristotle, distributive justice involves 
treating “like things, in a like manner.”27 According to Amartya Sen, 
all theories of distributive justice involve a requirement of equality; 
 
by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Penn Central Transportation v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  In that case, the majority upheld a New 
York City historic preservation law that limited plans for a major alteration 
of Penn Station.  Rehnquist noted that the owners of Penn Central were 
being singled out because the building was built too well, and Rehnquist, 
relying in part on Black’s statement in Armstrong, would have held the 
requirement a taking since it unfairly singled out the property owner to bear 
the cost of a public benefit. 
 27. See Aristotle,Politics, Everyman Ed., Warrington trans., at pg. 80-81; 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, V.3. 1131a10-b15. 
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theories vary only with respect to what quality is to be equalized 
among people – the “equalisandum.”.28 This requirement for equality 
of treatment is generally known as the “formal principle of justice.” 
Despite this focus on equality, distributive justice does not require 
that people be treated equally, only that differences in treatment are 
justifiable on grounds relevant to the distinction.29 As Aristotle noted: 
equals are entitled to equal things.  But here we are met with an 
important question: Equals and unequals in what? That is the 
difficult question.30 
Difficult question indeed. 
In contrast to the “formal principle of justice” that requires the 
equal treatment of equals, the “material principles of justice” define 
the criteria that justify differing treatment of individuals.  Under 
varying theories, distributive justice is satisfied if differences are 
justified under appropriate material principles of justice.  Thus, as 
discussed below, if “merit” is viewed as the appropriate material 
principle of justice, persons who work harder or produce more may be 
entitled to a greater share of a finite resource.  If “need” is the 
appropriate material principle, a view of “from each according to his 
ability, to each according to his need” may be justified.  Identification 
of appropriate “material principles” is perhaps the central debate in 
analysis of distributive justice. 
In most ethical theories, virtues and a Kantian set of morally 
compelled behaviors exist independent of the society in which they 
are evaluated.  Thus, benevolence towards others may be a virtue that 
is independent the social institutions of a culture. In contrast, many 
philosophers view distributive justice as constituting a virtue that can 
only be assessed or identified in a social context.31 As such, one 
cannot determine what is “just” outside the context of the institutions 
of society, and one cannot say what an individual is “due” under 
principle of distributive justice without regard to such institutions.  
Thus, the obligations of distributive justice are not defined ex-ante, 
but arise from the institutions that establish relationships and claims 
within a society.  Putting it simply, there may not be one morally 
 
28. Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined ? (1992). 
 29. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines distributive justice as 
principles specifying the just distribution of benefits and burdens: 
the outcome in which everyone receives their due.  A common 
basis is that persons should be treated equally unless reasons for 
inequality exist: after that the problems include the kind of 
reasons that justify departing from equality, the role of the state 
in rectifying inequality, the link between a distributive system 
and the maximization of well-being. 
Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (1996)(def. of “justice, 
distributive”) 
30.Aristotle,Politics, 80-81 (Everyman Ed., Warrington trans.). 
31  Indeed, David Hume described justice an “artificial virtue,”See David 
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) 
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correct answer to the obligations of distributive justice that can be 
identified through traditional ethical appeal to deontological 
obligations or moral intuition. 
B. THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
With these principles as a predicate, a variety of theories of 
distributive justice have been proposed to “solve” the question of how 
finite resources are to be “justly” allocated within society.  These 
theories have been organized in a variety of ways that highlight 
certain common qualities of the theories.  No particular classification 
perfectly captures the relationships among the differing theories, but 
they do help to focus on important elements.  The following taxonomy 
focuses on several factors and highlights specific approaches 
associated with these theories. 
 1.    Maximization of Social Utility 
Perhaps the most coherent and well explored theory of distributive 
justice is one which holds that resources should be divided to secure 
the greatest overall utility to society as a whole. - in other words, 
utilitarianism.  The philosopher most associated with a strict utilitarian 
theory of justice is, of course, Jeremy Bentham.  There are recurring 
issues with application of a Benthamite utilitarian approach.  What is 
the nature of the “utility” that is being maximized?  How do you 
assess the individual utilities that are to be maximized?  Yet, at its 
core, utilitarianism is based on a simple concept – there is a moral 
goal of maximizing the overall extent of satisfaction in society.32 
It would seem curious to claim utilitarianism as a credible theory of 
distributive justice.  One of the fundamental criticisms of 
utilitarianism is that the principle is blind to concerns for the 
distribution of utility within society.33 Certainly, the theory allows the 
unequal imposition of costs on some so long as the overall utility of 
society is furthered.  Nonetheless, utilitarianism in some form has 
been a central component of “welfare-based” analysis of distributive 
concerns.34 Something like utilitarianism has been analyzed in more 
traditional ethical modes. John Harsanyi, for example, has approached 
 
32. Although in some respects it seems to glorify a conception of 
efficiency as the goal of justice and fairness, utilitarianism clearly is 
premised on two compelling ethical principles.  First, each individual speaks 
with an equal voice in calculating overall efficiency.  Although different 
people have differing assessments of utility, each person’s assessment is 
entitled to the same weight.  In some sense, utilitarianism contains elements 
of autonomy, or respect for individual capacities, and impartiality in the 
sense of equal moral standing for each individual.  Second, utilitarianism is 
fundamentally grounded a virtue of benevolence.  The furthering of the well-
being of humans is itself a moral goal that forms the core of judgments about 
moral actions.   
 33.  See, e.g., William K. Frankena, Ethics (2d ed. 1973); Steven Kelman, 
Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, Regulation, January-February 
1981 at 33.  
 34  See, e.g., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Distributive Justice,” 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-distributive/. 
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the issue of distributive justice in a way that eliminates the bias of 
unearned differences in individual capacity.35 In other words, 
distributive justice is to be assessed not from the perspective of the cla 
ims of actual individuals, but rather from an “impartial” perspective 
that identifies justifiable moral claims independent of the identity of 
an existing claimant.  This approach involves application of a form of 
a Rawlsian “veil of ignorance.”  Harsanyi’s conclusion leads to a rule 
that maximizes the average utility of all members of society.  In other 
words, if you don’t know which role you will be assigned in society, 
the best rule of allocation for you to choose is one which maximizes 
the average utility of everyone.  This is a conclusion that is essentially 
equivalent to utilitarianism. 
At one time, the Supreme Court flirted with the idea of some 
concept of efficiency as a measure of the Takings Clause.  The Court 
suggested that a regulation could not be a Taking if it “substantially 
advanced legitimate state interests.”  In Lingle v. Chevron, U.S.A.,
however, the Court recently rejected this formulation.  The court 
concluded that a Takings assessment based on efficiency and 
rationality was inappropriate since a test that does not consider how a 
“burden is allocated cannot tell us when justice might require that the 
burden be spread among taxpayers through the payment of 
compensation.”36 
The Court’s conclusion is certainly appropriate and consistent with 
some criticisms of the distributive implications of utilitarianism.  The 
Court’s conclusion is not, however, compelled. This is not to suggest 
that utilitarianism is the correct or even a compelling principle of 
distributive justice.  It is to suggest that a utilitarian approach cannot 
be dismissed from the class of possible, legitimate ethical principles of 
distributive justice. 
 2.    Maximization of Individual Utilities 
Other approaches to distributive judgment involve an assessment of 
the individual utilities of competing claimants.  In contrast to a classic 
utilitarian approach which uses individual utility solely to calculate 
the sum of total social utility, these approaches try to define rules 
which fairly satisfy the individual objectives of the claimants. In 
effect, they attempt to define “fair” solutions to the problem of 
division of a finite resource that can be said to fairly satisfy the 
individual utility objectives of the competing actors.37 These 
 
35.  See John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for 
Morality? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory. 69 American Political Science 
Review 594-606 (1975). 
 36.  545 U.S. at 543. 
 37. See generally Brian M. Barry, Theories of Justice (1989).  The 
original insights for this area developed from the work of Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern.  Applying game theory principles to a fair division problem 
between two persons, the goal was to use information about the preferences 
of the two parties to determine some “best” allocation of a finite resource.  
Since these approaches rely on an assumption that a fair allocation will be in 
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approaches generally lead into the complex and highly mathematical 
area of game theory and bargaining solutions.  The work of John 
Nash, for example, has led to a series of Nash Bargaining Solutions to 
fair division problems. These types of analysis fall in the domain of 
mathematicians and economists, and pity the poor lawyers and judges 
who might need to understand these concepts. 
Reference to game theory, in fact, leads to the fundamental question 
- what does this have to do with an ethical issue of distributive justice?  
There is a well recognized disconnect between the language and 
methodology of game theory approaches and a more traditional 
philosophical approach to the ethics of distributive justice.38 
Nonetheless, these approaches do have standing as moral theories.  As 
noted above, an axiom of distributive justice, from Aristotle to Sen, is 
the goal of providing “equality” of treatment.  In an important sense, 
these game theory approached define the object of equality as 
individual utility. This is a conceptually strong basis for a fair or 
justice allocation; it is simply not the only basis as will be discussed 
below. 
Even if viewed as a form of ethical analysis of distributive justice, 
these game theory approaches have deep analytical problems that may 
prevent their application as a solution to Takings issues.  First, these 
approaches, relying as they do on a principle of equality of individual 
utility, ignore other possible principles that might be defensible in 
assessment of a fair distribution.  As will be discussed below, 
principles of “blameworthiness” or “need” are traditionally advocated 
as appropriate criteria.  Viewed in this way, Nash Bargaining 
Solutions and indeed most game theory approaches do not solve the 
problem of fair division; they simply define an approach to calculating 
the solution to one, among many possible, approaches to the definition 
of distributive justice.39 These approaches are not wrong; they simply 
 
the best interest of both parties, any fair allocation must provide that no party 
is worse off after the allocation than the party was before.  In such a case, 
both parties have an incentive to vary the initial allocation: one or both will 
be better off and neither will be worse off. 
 Given information about the parties’ initial position or “non-agreement 
point” and their relative preferences for the outcome, certain game theoretic 
approaches can provide a series of possible outcomes that defined a range of 
allocations that would improve the position of one or both parties.  Each of 
these different outcomes represented an allocation in which it was not 
possible to improve the utility of one party without decreasing the utility of 
the other – the pareto frontier.  They could not, however, produce a single or 
“unique” solution to a two player fair division problem.  A series of 
approaches stemming from the work of John Nash have provided solutions 
that purport to define a unique solution to a two player bargaining problem.  
These all, in one way or another, can be characterized as among a class of 
“Nash Bargaining Solutions.” 
 38. See John E. Roemer, Theories of Distributive Justice (1996). 
 39. It is possible to argue that, although additional factors may be 
appropriate in assessing the fairness and justice of division, any allocation 
that satisfies, for example, some form of Nash Bargaining Solution also 
satisfies minimum conceptions of fairness.  In other words, any solution that 
provides an equivalent division of individual utility presumptively satisfies a 
sense of fair or just allocation unless “trumped” by some other principle of 
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have no more moral standing than other approaches in consideration 
of fair division. 
More significantly, a fundamental problem arises from a basic 
premise of these approaches.  All require definition of a “non-
agreement” point that specifies the amount of the resource that the 
parties will receive in the absence of further allocation.40 
Identification of the non-agreement point is critical to define the range 
of possible outcomes.  No solution which makes a claimant worse off 
is permissible since that party has not incentive to move from the 
status quo.   
The very purpose of the Takings analysis, however, is to define the 
circumstances in which a party who currently owns property should 
be compensated when there is some reallocation of value from the 
owner to society as a whole.  If the non-agreement point is defined as 
absolute ownership, then there may be no bargaining solution that 
does not require compensation since no rational landowner makes that 
bargain.  If, however, existing property rights are not absolute, but are 
limited by legitimate government regulation, then some range of 
uncompensated “Takings” are possible as a “fair” distribution.  
 Indeed, the definition of the non-agreement point is, in many ways, 
the basic question of distributive justice in the context of a Takings 
analysis.  Since game theoretic approaches require the definition of a 
“non-agreement” point (and predict the implications that arise from a 
given non-agreement point), but they beg the fundamental questions 
raised by the Takings issue.  Some other principle or principles of 
distributive justice must be invoked to resolve this question. 
 3.    Justifiable Inequality 
Although distributive justice is premised on a goal of equality of 
treatment, in many ways the goal is not to define the elements of 
equality; rather the goal is to define the elements that justify unequal 
treatment among individuals.  In other words, distributive justice 
requires equal treatment of all individuals unless there is a “material 
principle” that justifies different and unequal treatment.  A search for 
justifiable principles of inequality leads to a vast set of proposals in 
the history of moral philosophy.  In these approaches, the key 
component of distributive justice is the moral justification that is made 
for any specific material principle of justice.  Obviously, there is no 
consensus on any one approach to define universally acceptable 
principles. 
One historically significant material principle of justice is an 
allocation based on “need;” the factor that justifies different treatment 
of people is their varying levels of need.  With need as the principle of 
justice, a redistribution of wealth from “haves” to “have nots” is just.  
 
distributive justice.  A solution which does not constitute a Nash Bargaining 
Solution might be presumptively unfair unless justified by some other 
principle. 
 40. See supra note 37.  
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Although having a familiar Marxist flavor, some view of fairness and 
justice as not only authorizing but compelling special treatment for the 
needy has a strong ethical pedigree. 
Other views of justice justify the different treatment of individuals 
based on “merit” or “desert.”  In other words, individuals through 
their effort or other morally commendable behavior are entitled to a 
greater share of resources. In contrast to a theory of merit that justifies 
a reward for morally praiseworthy or productive effort, it is a 
relatively uncontroversial proposition that a principle of distributive 
justice allows for the different treatment of individual’s who engage in 
morally blameworthy conduct.  Thus, few theories of distributive 
justice would preclude a reallocation of an existing resource from an 
individual that acquired the resource through theft or by violation of 
some other socially proscribed conduct such as cheating or even 
monopolistic behavior.  The goal of a theory of distributive justice 
that relies on a criterion of blameworthiness is to define that class of 
“bad” behavior that justifies redistribution.  As discussed below, this 
issue is implicit in much of the Court’s search for Takings criteria. 
 4.    Impartiality and Process 
Other approaches to distributive justice invoke a conception of 
impartiality in assessing the justice of the distribution of resources in 
society.  The goal of this approach is to define the elements of social 
institutions that result in a fair distribution of resources in a manner 
that is neutral or impartial with respect to any individual’s class or 
status role in society.  The focus of this approach is not on the 
outcome of the distribution, but on the process and rules that decide 
the allocation.41 
Several premises underlie much of this thinking.  First, distributive 
justice is implemented through social institutions, and it is the fairness 
of institutions, not the fairness of individual determinations or 
allocations, that should be the focus of justice concerns. Second, 
individuals have no moral claim to their individual capacity or status 
in society (i.e., intelligence, strength, inherited status) and fairness 
therefore requires a distributive scheme that does not depend on 
allocation based on capacity.  This does not mean that just institutions 
cannot make distinctions based on these capacities, but it does mean 
that the justness of the institutions themselves must be assessed in a 
manner that is impartial and not biased to further the ends of any 
particular class or status.  Third, to the extent distributive justice is 
premised on self-interest, and just social institutions are to be assessed 
 
41  Robert Nozick, for example, would distringuish between patterned and 
unpatterned conceptions of distributionive justice.  Patterned conceptions 
judge the fairness of an allocation by whether there is, at a given point in 
time, a “just” distribution of resources in society.  Unpatterned conceptions, 
in contrast, focus not on the outcome, but on the rules of allocation.  In 
Nozick’s view, a given distribution of resources is not subject to criticism on 
distributive justice grounds if the initial allocation was fair and the rules of 
subsequent transfer among individuals are fair.  See Robert Nozick, 
Anarchy, State and Utopia (1975). 
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based on the extent to which they satisfy the self-interest of an 
impartial participant. 
Evaluating distributive justice through a lens of impartiality has 
both strength and weaknesses in the Takings context.  A focus on 
social institutions rather than specific outcomes clearly has 
advantages.  If social institutions are designed in a way that is 
perceived to result in distributive justice, the role of the courts would 
focus on ensuring the proper operation of the institution rather than an 
assessment of the outcome.  Further, it has an appealing approach to 
the problem of equality by seeking to define institutions that are 
equally fair and equally acceptable to all elements of society since, in 
this approach, institutions must be assessed based on the possibility 
that any individual might occupy any position in society. 
Distributive justice as impartiality has, however, obvious flaws as a 
tool for practical application.  Unlike claims of game theory, it defines 
an approach rather than a unique solution to distributive justice 
questions.  Further, to the extent that elements such as a Rawlsian 
“difference principle” rely not on impartial self-interest, but on a 
moral concern that justifies redistributive policies, this approach 
requires application of a material principle other than impartiality. 
IV.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE AS A 
PRINCIPLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
If the Takings Clause is seen as embodying a principle of 
distributive justice, then it is time for the Supreme Court seriously to 
consider the implications that follow from this view.  This is not an 
idle academic exercise; much is at stake in terms of the limits on 
government authority and the perception of legitimacy of the Court’s 
approach. 
One thing certainly does not follow from this view.  Application of 
the Takings Clause does not become simpler or clearer; no bright line 
test emerges to replace the current muddle.  As Justice O’Connor has 
noted, principles of “justice and fairness” are less than “fully 
determinate.”42 The Supreme Court’s goal, if distributive justice is to 
be taken seriously, should be to articulate the factors that justify the 
imposition of regulatory costs on a limited group of people.43 
42. 533 U.S. at 633. 
 43. Obviously, this is a search for principles grounded in “justice and 
fairness.”  Citing language from Armstrong, Dean Kmiec states that “[t]he 
straightforward purpose of the Takings Clause is to avoid the 
disproportionate placement of public burdens upon a single property owner.”  
Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings 
Puzzle, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 996  (1997).  This statement, however, 
seriously mischaracterizes the Armstrong principle of distributive justice 
under which an action would be a taking if it “unfairly” or “unjustly” 
imposed a burden.  “Disproportionate” burdens fail a test of distributive 
justice only if you view “proportion” as the appropriate principle of justice.  
If “disproportionate” is merely means that a Taking results when the 
distribution fails a test of “fairness” under some other material principle,  
then it is simply a tautology. 
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A. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
One of the great challenges to conceptions of distributive justice is 
to reconcile concerns for justice with claims of individual rights.  If 
distributive justice focuses on the “fair” and “equal” resolution of 
competing claims by individuals, a focus on individual rights has, as a 
central quality, a claim that such rights cannot be sacrificed to further 
a general social value.  In Ronald Dworkin’s phrase, rights are 
‘trump” that cannot be required to yield to a general utilitarian 
concern with social utility.44 If, as discussed below, utilitarianism 
represents one valid theory of distributive justice, concerns for 
individual rights and distributive justice may, in certain 
circumstances, be in conflict. 
Although not all theories of distributive justice create an inevitable 
conflict, the language of distributive justice and individual rights is 
clearly different.  Rights language asks what fundamental claims can 
an individual make on society.  In contrast, distributive justice asks 
how access to limited resources is to be allocated within society.  
Justice and fairness, in distributive justice terms, implies the 
possibility of trade-offs and compromise to satisfy the legitimate 
claims of competing individuals.  Analyses based on individual rights 
have a quality of absolutism that is contrary to an approach of 
compromise and allocation.  Rights have a Kantian or deontological 
quality while distributive justice, in Hume’s term, is an artificial virtue 
tied to particular social institutions. 
Thus, a shift in Fifth Amendment Takings analysis from a focus on 
property rights to a concern for the “justice and fairness” of the 
allocation of costs of social programs is a major, if subtle, shift in a 
view of the purpose of the Takings Clause 
B. REASSESSING TAKINGS FACTORS IN LIGHT OF DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE 
Although the Court has generally failed expressly to evaluate its 
balancing factors in terms of distributive justice, most factors appear 
to have a rough relevance to a consideration of fairness.  Much like 
Moliere’s Monsieur Jourdain, the Supreme Court may have been 
speaking “fairness and justice” for forty years without knowing it. A
sharper focus on the implication of these factors to issues of 
distributive justice will, however, likely alter the way they are 
evaluated and suggest others that might be relevant. 
 1.  Reciprocity of Advantage 
At least since Pennsylvania Coal the Supreme Court has recognized 
that “reciprocity of advantage” is relevant in determining whether a 
regulation is a taking.  Although a regulation may burden me to 
benefit another, that same regulation may benefit another to benefit 
 
44.  
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me.  The issue of reciprocity, in part, addresses the question of loss.  It 
asks whether the benefits of the regulation to the landowner offset the 
burdens; a regulation will not be a taking if the landowner receives 
sufficient benefit to require no additional compensation.  In other 
words: no harm, no foul. 
This concept of “reciprocity of advantage” is clearly relevant to 
virtually any assessment of distributive justice.  Without loss, it is 
hard to say that a person has been unfairly singled out to bear the cost 
of regulation.45 In many ways, it is an imperfect application of a 
principle of equivalent individual utility, and satisfaction of a 
condition of reciprocity of benefits and burdens may define one class 
of regulations that do not require compensation.  Regulations that do 
not provide reciprocity of advantage may still be justifiably imposed 
without compensation if they satisfy some other principle of 
distributive justice.  Reciprocity of benefits and burdens is thus a 
sufficient but not necessary condition for determining regulations that, 
in “justice and fairness,” do not require compensation.  
 2. Magnitude of Loss 
One of the more puzzling factors used by the Court in assessing 
takings is the magnitude of the loss suffered by a landowner.  The 
clear implication of the Court’s pragmatic balancing approach is that 
some substantial level of loss must be accepted but that too great a 
loss results in a taking.  Thus, at least since the crucial zoning case of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty,46 losses of property value of up to 75% may 
not constitute a taking.  In contrast, the Court in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Commission47 held that a 100% loss of value is a 
“per se” taking.  Forgetting, for the moment, the difficulty of drawing 
the line where a loss of value becomes “too great,” the Court has 
never clearly articulated why some substantial loss does not require 
compensation while somewhat more loss does. 
The answer may lie in terms of distributive justice.  If we view most 
regulations as resulting in a roughly fair distribution of benefits and 
burdens over time (a form of “temporal” reciprocity of advantage), 
significant short-term burdens (although ultimately compensated 
through general social regulation) may still be viewed as unfair.  Thus, 
in fairness terms, the issue of the magnitude of loss is relevant to 
determining whether a landowner has suffered a burden that is not 
only disproportionate over the short-term but also of such a magnitude 
that it is unfair to require a landowner to bear it at any time. 
 
45. Although phrased in terms of “reciprocity of advantage” the principle 
surely cannot focus simply on the equality of benefits among affected 
landowners. Is distributive justice satisfied if my neighbor and I receive 
reciprocal benefits from a regulation although the regulation imposes a 
greater burden on me?  The factor of reciprocity should, for purposes of 
distributive justice, focus not only on the magnitude and reciprocity of 
benefit but also on whether affected parties are all treated with some rough 
equality in terms of both benefits and burdens. 
 46. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 47. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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But again the issue is “how much is too much”?  Perhaps, the anser 
lies in a utilitarian assessment of efficiency as reflected in insurance 
theory.  Insurance involves the sharing of risk with others to minimize 
loss, but, in most economic views, insurance is appropriately 
employed only to avoid catastrophic loss from unusual and 
unpredictable events.  Insurance theory indicates that we should not 
buy insurance to cover relatively small losses that arise from the 
regular and expected events; it is economically more rational to bear 
such losses ourselves.  I am reasonably sure that there are nice 
formulas developed by economists that indicate the economically 
rational situations in which risks should be spread through insurance. 
Perhaps the Takings Clause can be seen, in part, as a form of social 
insurance that requires compensation for catastrophic loss through 
regulation. Through taxes we pay the premiums for protection against 
such catastrophic loss, but we bear the costs of routine regulatory loss 
ourselves.  In this view “temporal reciprocity” justifies the fairness of 
routine regulation and the “social insurance” aspect mitigates the 
unfairness of a loss of beyond a certain magnitude. 
 3.  Blameworthy Conduct 
A factor that has dogged the Supreme Court’s takings analysis has 
been the relevance of “blameworthiness” in assessing a taking.  Is a 
regulation less likely to be a taking if it prohibits blameworthy 
conduct of the affected landowner?  Is a regulation more likely to be a 
taking if it regulates otherwise benign conduct?  It would be hard to 
dispute that the moral blameworthiness of the burdened landowner 
would be relevant in assessing the distributive justice of a regulation. 
No one complains that landowners have lost value because they are 
prohibited from selling heroin or dumping nuclear waste on their 
property. 
The problem arises in how to characterize “blameworthiness.”  One 
strange line of thinking suggested by the Court can be seen as the 
“two sided coin” approach.  In this view, forcing a landowner to 
confer a public benefit is equivalent (the flip side of the coin) to 
preventing the harm of losing the benefit.  This was, in part, the logic 
employed by the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. 
v. New York City.48 In Penn Central, the Court upheld a New York 
landmark preservation ordinance that limited the development of an 
historic building.  Altering Penn Station may be an aesthetic disaster, 
but it is harder to make the case that the owner of a building 
considered important to the public is morally blameworthy for 
developing the building in the same manner available to the owners of 
less important buildings.  Nonetheless, part of the Supreme Court’s 
analysis was premised on the view that altering the building was, in 
some sense, equivalent to harm-inflicting acts that are the more 
traditional target of government regulation. 
 
48. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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In contrast, others have suggested a view premised on an analysis of 
common law rules of nuisance.  Although the Supreme Court has 
never gone this far, some have advocated a view that nuisance, the 
historic common law approach to regulating “unreasonable” uses of 
land, serves to define the limits of uncompensated government 
takings.49 In this view, the government would be free to regulate 
nuisance-like behavior, but the Takings Clause would require 
compensation when the government regulated conduct that did not
constitute a common law nuisance.  In part, this view is premised on 
the view that one can have no legitimate expectation of a property 
interest in conducting nuisance like activity.  It also, however, seems 
to reflect a view that nuisance like activity is also “blameworthy” and 
thus not entitled to compensation.  Conceptions of nuisance that focus 
on efficiency concerns in reconciling two legitimate but competing 
uses, however, suggest that an evaluation of moral blameworthiness is 
not equivalent to an assessment of nuisance. 
Thus, the issue of “blameworthiness” cannot be resolved either by 
sophistry or common law rules of land use.  The issue, as focused by a 
concern for distributive justice, may more properly address whether 
the conduct of the affected landowner is such that it is appropriate to 
impose the onus of uncompensated regulation to address the 
consequence of the behavior.50 
4.  Investment-Backed Expectations 
The Supreme Court has regularly stated that it is relevant for 
purposes of a takings analysis if a regulation affects reasonable 
“investment-backed expectations.”  This concept, first articulated by 
the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City,51 has been the subject of much debate and more confusion.52 
49. See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 13.  There are hints of this approach In 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  In 
Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a regulation that prohibits a common law 
nuisance can never be a taking (in part based on the logic that you can never 
be deprived of a property right that you never had).  Although this seems 
clearly correct, it says nothing about whether a regulation could be a taking 
if it regulated other than nuisance-like behavior. In Lucas, the Court 
accepted as fact that the land in question had lost all of its value as a result of 
a government regulation.  The Supreme Court adopted a per se takings rule 
that a 100% loss of value will be a taking unless the government was 
regulating a traditional common law nuisance.  The Court did not resolve the 
issue of when a taking will be found where there is less than a 100% loss in 
value. 
 50. Even a focus on the moral “blameworthiness” of conduct raises very 
difficult questions.  Is destruction of critical habitat of an endangered species 
sufficiently blameworthy to justify regulation without compensation?  
Destruction of this remaining habitat may only be significant because ninety 
percent of the habitat has previously been destroyed by unregulated prior 
development.  In other words, how is one to claim that uncompensated 
regulation is justified based on the blameworthiness of conduct when the 
“blameworthy” consequences arise only because the landowner is among the 
last to engage in the conduct. 
 51. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 52. There is general consensus that the Supreme Court has thoroughly 
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Although recognition of a role for “investment-backed expectations,” 
apparently finds it origin in Professor Michelman’s classic, Property, 
Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of  “Just 
Compensation” Law,53 the Supreme Court has never been clear about 
the relationship of “investment-backed expectations” to questions of 
“justice and fairness.” 
Surely, however, a landowner’s “expectations” are relevant to an 
assessment of the fairness of imposing regulatory burdens.  A focus 
on “expectations” can reflect a concern with the fairness of imposing 
costs on a landowner who has reasonably relied on a state of law. 
Certainly, the extent of reliance, perhaps reflected in the concept of 
“investment-backed” expectations, is relevant to the fairness of the 
allocation of costs. 
The challenge is to turn the concept of “investment-backed 
expectations” to a focus on criteria of distributive justice.  What are 
the special qualities of expectation that warrant special treatment of 
some landowners as opposed to others?  Michelman provided some 
answers, but there are certainly others.  Again, a concern for 
distributive justice does not resolve these questions but may help 
sharpen the focus and rationale on the role of expectations in takings 
analysis. 
 5.  Selection Process 
If distributive justice is concerned with unfairly “singling out” a 
person to bear the costs of regulation, one would assume that the 
actual process of selection would be relevant in assessing fairness.  
Decision-making processes that may repeatedly single out certain 
groups to bear regulatory costs would raise distributive justice, and 
therefore takings, concerns. 
The Supreme Court, however, has only obliquely indicated that a 
takings analysis involves a focus on the decision-making process.  
There is an odd line of takings cases in which courts have not found a 
 
muddied any coherent basis for a concern for “investment-backed 
expectations.”  See, e.g., R.S. Radford and J. David Breemer, Great 
Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of 
Investment-Backed Expectations, 9 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 449 (2001); Daniel R. 
Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 Urb. Law. 
215 (1995). 
 53. Michelman, supra note 6.  In his article, Professor Michelman 
identified the importance of the role of “justified, investment-backed 
expectations”” in evaluating takings claims.  See Michelman, supra note 6 at 
1213.  In part, Michelman focused on a utilitarian component that requires 
protection of expectations to promote efficient use of property.   As 
Michelman notes, in a utilitarian analysis “security of expectation is 
cherished, not for its own sake, but only as a shield for morale.”  Id.
Michelman also expressed the view that “the purpose of compensation is to 
prevent the special kind of suffering on the part of people who have grounds 
for feeling themselves the victim of unprincipled exploitation.” Id. at 1230.  
This suggests some deontological obligation to avoid harming others as a 
basis for the Taking Clause.  Yet utilitarian or deontological concerns for the 
protection of expectations do not capture the full set of issues of distributive 
justice that warrant protection of certain classes of reasonable expectations. 
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taking when the regulation was a result of some natural calamity.  
Thus, in the important but odd case of Miller v. Schoene,54 the 
Supreme Court found no taking when the owner of cedar trees was 
required, in order to prevent the spread of an infectious disease, to 
destroy his trees to protect economically more value apple trees.  
Conceding the legitimacy of the need to protect the more valuable 
apple trees, this hardly provides an explanation of why fairness does 
not require compensation of the owner of the cedar trees.  Certainly, 
the Court failed to provide such an explanation. 
Perhaps the answer lies in the issue of process.  The owner of the 
cedar trees was singled out, not by the potentially manipulated 
political process, but rather by the vagaries of disease.  In other words, 
God, not people, selected the victim.  If you have questions about 
fairness, take it up with clergy not the courts. 
Whether this in fact underlies the courts’ treatment of calamity 
cases, the issue of selection process seems relevant to an assessment 
of fairness.  In line with the calamity cases, a regulation should be less 
likely to be seen as a taking when the burden imposed by a regulation 
is assigned based on some objective criteria that do not lend 
themselves to political manipulation.  In this view, Endangered 
Species Act or wetlands regulations would not raise heightened 
takings concerns if restrictions were imposed based on the qualities of 
the land (and its critters) rather than the qualities of the landowner. 
C. LOOKING TO SOURCES BEYOND THE LAW 
The Supreme Court’s search for factors relevant to a takings 
analysis has been long on imagination but short on references.  The 
academic literature is rich with political and economic analyses of the 
takings issue, but this has generally been of little utility to the Court.  
It is problematic to rely on political theory and economics when it is 
unclear how those relate to the core objectives of the Takings Clause. 
A focus on the Takings Clause as a principle of distributive justice 
has the potential to open a line of takings analysis based on the 
literature of moral philosophy.  There is a substantial body of 
literature evaluating the concept and application of distributive justice 
that could be relevant to a court’s analysis. It might be odd to cite 
Aristotle in support of a takings argument before the Supreme Court, 
but the inherently extra-legal judgments inherent in distributive justice 
may point to reliance on extra-legal sources. 
The application of philosophical analysis to law is not, of course, 
unknown.  John Rawls, Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, among 
many others, bring substantial insights from philosophy into the legal 
discourse on the Takings Clause.  Perhaps the most influential (or at 
least cited) law review article on takings, Professor Michelman’s 
Property, Utility and Fairness, provides an interesting analysis of 
 
54. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
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fairness in the takings context through an application of Rawls.55 
Thus, a focus on the Takings Clause in terms of distributive justice 
could open the door to a whole body of literature and analysis to 
inform the Takings debate.  Thus, it may be appropriate to cite 
Aristotle as well as Euclid.56 
D. LEGITIMACY, JUDGES AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Although a focus on distributive justice may open the door to a 
judicial evaluation of philosophical concepts, the question remains as 
to whether we want judges to walk through that door.  How is one to 
assess the legitimacy of a position that requires judge’s to apply their 
conceptions of “fairness and justice” in establishing limits on 
government power? 
This issue raises a number of questions (and one significant 
conclusion).  The initial question is whether a proposed theory of the 
Takings Clause that requires courts to make such indeterminate and 
extra-legal judgments fails on that ground alone?  In other words, is it 
impermissible to interpret the Takings Clause in distributive justice 
terms because it requires judges to become involved in philosophical 
issues of fairness? 
There are several not so simple responses to this concern.  First, it is 
the Supreme Court itself that has articulated this rationale for the 
Takings Clause.  It is also a principle that has been cited by a wide 
spectrum of views on the Court – from Blackmun to Rehnquist and 
Scalia.  You can blame them if you do not like this claim of judicial 
authority.  Second, alternative interpretations of the Takings Clause 
involve the courts in applying their value judgments; an express 
reliance of distributive justice makes this process more open.  Finally, 
other aspects of constitutional interpretation, particularly the 
development of “substantive due process,” involve the courts in extra-
textual and arguably extra-judicial limits on government power.  Thus, 
the intrusion of judges’ values into constitutional interpretation has 
some pedigree. 
A second question is whether, as an institutional matter, it is proper 
to rely on the philosophical views of a narrow, unelected, and 
unaccountable group of judges.  Since this approach to the Takings 
Clause largely eliminates any “neutral” anchoring of takings analysis 
in text or history, a concern that the biases and prejudices of judges 
will shape takings law is quite real.57 Certainly, concerns for modes 
 
55. Michelman, supra note 6.  Michelman’s article relies on an early 
version of Rawls’ work and hence fails to consider certain implications of 
changes, particularly the “difference principle, that Rawls made to his 
theories in a later version of A Theory of Justice.
56. Referring, of course, to City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 
(1926). 
 57. Addressing this issue, Professor Michelman notes that “[h]owever 
difficult the fairness standard may be to formulate and apply, there is no 
obvious reason for supposing that political actors should be able to 
understand it or handle it more deftly than judges can.”  See Michelman, 
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of constitutional interpretation that rely on the underlying values of 
unelected judges are widely expressed by scholars and judges.58 A
focus on distributional justice has the virtue, at least, of being more, 
rather than less, explicit about this aspect of the law. 
A third question is whether society would accept takings decisions 
premised on judicial views of distributive justice?59 Will individuals 
be content to accept restrictions on the use of their property based on 
assurances by a court that it is fair?  As noted, Rawls’ theory of justice 
involves an identification of those social practices and institutions that 
disinterested observers, operating behind a “veil of ignorance” as to 
their place in society, would agree are fair.  This suggests that an 
individual could be expected to accept a decision based on the 
following logic: “You would think it was fair if you were as smart as I 
am.”  This is perhaps not the most compelling argument for social 
acceptance of imposition of a regulatory burden. 
These concerns with the institutional legitimacy of judicially 
derived judgments of distributive justice thus suggest perhaps the 
most significant consequence of a principle of takings grounded in 
“justice and fairness.”  Since courts have limited institutional 
competence and few neutral criteria to apply in making distributive 
justice decisions, judges should be extremely chary of substituting 
their views of fairness for legislative judgments.  In other words, the 
Takings Clause should have limited force except in the most extreme 
cases.  This is not an abandonment of the principle of distributive 
justice, but it is a recognition that such judgments are better left to 
elected and socially responsive legislatures rather than courts. 
This seems to be exactly the position taken by the Supreme Court in 
the area of substantive due process and the regulation of land use.  
Although the Court has recognized the possibility of invalidating 
legislative acts on due process grounds, it has largely chosen not to 
exercise such power except in defined areas of fundamental rights.60 
supra note 6 at 1248. 
 58. Concerns range the spectrum from “legal realists,” such as Karl 
Llewellyn, to Scalia’s criticism of the Court’s analysis in abortion decisions.  
See, e.g.,Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
984 (Scalia, dissenting).  For some, however, moral readings are at the heart 
of a process of interpretation of fundamental liberties in the Constitution.  
See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American 
Constitution (1996). 
It is certainly not my intent here to delve in the murky waters of 
constitutional interpretation and post-modern critiques of the nature of the 
judicial process.  Suffice it to say that an express reliance on principles of 
distributive justice clearly highlights the amorphous and untethered basis of 
judicial review of Takings. 
 59. The question of the legitimacy of courts in a democratic society raises 
its own set of concerns.  See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 
(1980); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991). 
 60. Thus concepts of substantive due process, hinted at by the Supreme 
Court in City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) and Nectow v.
City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), have largely disappeared from 
federal constitutional analysis in regulation of land use.  Cf. City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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In this view, the conjoined twins of “due process” and “takings,” 
both contained within the same sentence of the Fifth Amendment, 
would serve as conceptual limits to government power, but a limit that 
would be sparingly invoked by the courts.  Although specialized cases 
of takings (particularly actions that approach exercise of eminent 
domain power) might be subject to a more searching takings analysis, 
courts would largely defer to legislative judgments of fairness in most 
cases of regulatory restrictions. 
In fact, this sounds like what the court is doing.61 What is different 
is that a focus on distributive justice provides a clearer basis than the 
Court’s current reliance on an unexplained and unexplainable 
balancing act.  Further, it does suggest a line of analysis for courts 
brave enough to take on concepts of distributive justice. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For good or ill, the concept of the Takings Clause as a principle of 
distributive justice arises from the Supreme Court’s own statements.  
The Supreme Court has made and repeated the claim that the Takings 
Clause is “designed to bar Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should 
be borne by the public as a whole. “  At a minimum the Court should 
be aware of the consequences that follow from such a view. 
Viewed through the lens of distributive justice, takings analysis 
gains a sharper focus on those factors that are relevant to assessing the 
“fairness” of imposing costs on the few to benefit the many.  The 
logical implication of this view is a takings test which is no more clear 
or certain in application than the current muddle.  Additionally it 
expressly requires the courts to engage in social and philosophical 
judgments which many would say are beyond their competence (used 
both in the sense of judges’ institutional role and their intelligence).  
Perhaps most significantly, it suggests a limited role for the judiciary 
in policing the social judgments of legislators and could confine the 
Takings Clause, along with the Due Process Clause, to a limited role. 
 
61. The Supreme Court in Kelo v. New London, Conn., 549 U.S. 469 
(2005), specifically articulated a general rule of deference to legislative 
judgments of “public purpose” in the Fifth Amendment context of eminent 
domain. 
